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Abstract—This paper investigates new methods to measure,
quantify and evaluate the security posture of human organi-
zations especially within large corporations and government
agencies. Computer security is not just about technology and
systems. It is also about the people that use those systems and
how their vulnerable behaviors can lead to exploitation. We focus
on measuring enterprise-level susceptibility to phishing attacks.
Results of experiments conducted at Columbia University and
the system used to conduct the experiments are presented that
show how the system can also be effective for training users. We
include a description of follow-on work that has been proposed
to DHS that aims to measure and improve the security posture of
government departments and agencies, as well as for comparing
security postures of individual agencies against one another.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lord Kelvin taught us that without numbers there is no sci-
ence. Indeed, quantification lies at the very heart of scientific
progress. Without measurement, one cannot know what has
been learned or achieved and whether our knowledge has been
advanced or progress has been made. The field of computer
and information security requires the foundational science that
provides the means for assessing the strength of organizational
security postures. For the Department of Homeland Security
needs, solid metrics may be applied as a means of assessing
the strength of one organization relative to others, and to help
identify vulnerabilities.
There are a few notable successes in the field of computer
security where metrics have been well established and prof-
itably applied to practical technologies with mathematically
provable security properties. Cryptography has provided tools
for researchers and developers to devise many practical and
widely deployed technologies that provide for confidentiality.
The formal analysis of the hardness of certain computational
problems establishes a metric to judge the strength of an
encryption scheme based upon key length, for example. How-
ever, cryptography alone does not provide all of the security
guarantees we may want. Other areas of computer security
have provided metrics to evaluate the relative merits of specific
technologies, such as detection accuracy rates of competing in-
trusion detection systems. Computer security is not just about
technology and systems, but must also take into consideration
the people and processes that rely on the systems. In this work,
we propose an approach to measuring organizational security
and educating users that relies on mimicking attackers’ actions
in social attacks.
Social attacks include those that occur when an attacker
uses any of a variety social attack vectors that may range
from email and telephone, to in-person encounters. According
to the 2010 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report [2],
social attacks were used in 28% of the breaches for 2009 and
nearly a quarter of these attacks occurred due to phishing.
In these types of attacks, victims are sent spoofed emails
that appear to be benign notifications from a bank, a social
networking site, or a software upgrade. When victims take
the bait, they are often greeted with some form of malicious
software that attempts to install itself on victim’s machine.
Although there have been many technological advances that
seem to hold promise in stopping these attacks, so far, none
of them have proven 100% effective allowing the problem to
continue. In fact, the vulnerability posed by phishing is often
used effectively in the largest, most costly attacks happening
today, like the recent attack on RSA [3].
Although the primary focus of the work is on measuring
organizational security, the results suggest that the system also
provides utility in training users. The defense approach we are
advocating in this paper involves better educating users to be
cautious of suspicious emails. Traditional training techniques
can be beneficial, but they are often not enough. Our technique
involves testing users’ vulnerability using a variety of decoy
emails; those that fall victim to our phony phishing attacks are
informed so that they may learn and change their behavior.
Subsequent tests of the same users show that this method
works, although sometimes it takes several iterations of testing
and teaching.
How a user responds to security significant events is also an
important consideration for organizational security. For exam-
ple, if someone receives a spear phishing email, how do they
handle it? They could simply delete it, but optimally, they may
report it so that appropriate actions are put in place to protect
other users. The processes that an organization has in place and
how they are socialized are essential for strong defense. The
proposed system has been designed to automatically monitor
emails sent to determine when a user falls for them, but it
can also be used to test user responses to security events, an
area that often gets little attention. These metrics may be used
to evaluate and quantitatively determine the effectiveness of
organizational policies and reporting processes.
A. Summary of Results
Experiments were conducted at Columbia University over
the course of a year with a randomly selected group of 4000
unwitting students, staff, and faculty. Each of the study’s
participants were sent one of four types of phony phishing
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emails modeled after real phishing emails. The emails included
attachments, embedded URLs, and forms to obtain user cre-
dentials. The experiments began with 500 emails being sent for
each of the four types. Users that fell for the phony phishing
emails were presented with messages informing them that
their behavior made them particularly vulnerable to phishing
attacks. Only users that fell for the phony phishing emails
were selected for the next round in which they were sent a
variation of the phony phishing email several weeks later. In
summary, it took a total of four rounds before all users were
able to identify the emails as being potentially malicious. The
experiment was then repeated with a new group of 2000 of
participants and phony phishing emails. The results of both
experiments suggest that decoy technology can be used for
training users to be cognizant of potential threats and that it can
provide useful metrics for assessing organizational security.
Applying the same set measurements laterally across multiple
organizations can be useful in measuring one organization’s
security posture relative to another’s.
B. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II contains a description of related work. Section III contains
a description of the proposed system that was used to conduct
the experiments. Section III provides the details of the
experimental analysis and results. Section V provides an
overview on how the system and approach can provide utility
to the Department of Homeland Security. Finally, Section VI
describes areas requiring further research.
II. RELATED WORK
The computer security field demand for techniques to eval-
uate and compare security designs and organizations. Many
techniques have been proposed and explored [1], but these
typically focus on systems and technologies rather than people.
Our work aims to demonstrate techniques aimed at measuring
organizational security through its people rather than just with
the technology on which they rely.
The proposed system is designed for educating users and
measuring organizational security using decoy emails. Tra-
ditional security training classes can be beneficial for or-
ganizations, but they are not enough and there are more
effective methods [4]. Our technique involves testing users’
vulnerability using a variety of decoy emails; those that fall
victim to our phony phishing attacks are informed so that they
may learn and change their behavior. Traditional approaches
for training users about the threat posed by phishing rely
on classes and informational warnings. Efforts to raise user
awareness have focused on testing users to demonstrate their
vulnerability [5]. Some tools have been created to support the
sending of fake phishing emails for purposes of pen testing and
training [6], [7], but these rely on an administrator to manually
construct and send the emails to targeted individuals. None
of these tools focus on the development of formal metrics
for measuring organizational security such that they can be
used for relative comparisons for comparing one organization
against another.
A similar study was conducted at Indiana University, which
involved social phishing and spoofing [8]. As part of the
study, the researchers launched harmless phishing attacks on
the students, specifically targeting students aged 18-24. The
experiment was performed with intent to show that social
context can be used in effective phishing. Unlike our efforts,
they did not focus on how useful metrics could be obtained
from the experiments or on techniques for improving an
organizational security posture.
The Honeynet project titled Know your enemy provides
practical information on the practice of phishing and draws
on data collected by the German Honeynet Project and UK
Honeynet Project [9]. This paper discusses on the various
techniques and tools used by the phishers, providing three
examples of empirical research where real-world phishing
attacks were captured using a Honeynet.
III. PHONY PHISH SYSTEM
The goal of the Phony Phish System is to provide an
automatic means to generate and send benign phishing emails
that can be used to measure an organization’s security and
educate users. The system consists of several components as
shown in Figure 1.
a) Crawler Module:: This component was designed to
crawl a directory and obtain a list of target identities to
perform the experiments on. For the experiments described
in IV, this module was used to search the Columbia University
directory, select users, their role within the university, and
which department they belong to.
b) Email Generator:: The email generator integrates all
of the components and was used to deliver emails for the
experiments. This component takes real email as input and
performs processing on them to change entity names. For this
task, we used the Stanford Named Entity Recognizer1. The
email generator component also functions to anonymize user
identify information through the use of MD5 hashes. For the
generation of beacon’ed documents, the email generator relies
on the Decoy Document Distributor described in [10].
c) Web Application:: A web application is used to collect
user responses when they click on links and submit forms
containing credentials. It tracks responses using a base 64
encoded query string that is tied to user requests. The system
does not the store the identify of users, only the time at which
the link was clicked, the department that the user belongs to,
and the role of a user within the organization.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Experiments were conducted by sending 500 emails for
each of four different types of decoy emails. Using standard
statistical techniques [11], this sample size was determined to
be significant for measuring a single population parameter (i.e.,
will a user open an email) with a 5% margin of error and 95%
1http://nlp.stanford.edu/ner/index.shtml
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Fig. 1. Components of the Phony Phish System.
confidence for the approximately 70,000 IDs in the Columbia
University directory. A second consideration for the choice of
using 500 was for practical reasons. Our intent was to have
a sample size large enough to draw scientifically significant
conclusions without burdening an unnecessary number of
subjects. Although we had permission from the university, and
the approval of the Columbia University Institutional Review
Board, the subjects were unwitting participants. The nature of
this kind of experiment has the potential to cost users in both
time and aggravation. Given that this was our first attempt
at such an experiment, we decided we would start with 500
emails for each of the four types and adjust as necessary.
The decoy emails were modeled after various types of
phishing attacks that occur in the wild. All of the emails were
sent using an external email account from a popular webmail
provider. Users that fell victim to the phony phishing emails
were presented with the following message:
The Columbia University IDS Lab is conducting experiments
designed to measure the security posture of large organizations
and to educate users about safe practices so that they avoid
falling prey to malicious emails. The emails automatically
generated and sent to users of Columbias network and email
system are designed to test whether users violate basic security
policies. Although our emails are completely benign, please
be aware that many emails are sent that are designed to trick
unsuspecting users into giving up identity information.
The four different types of emails and their results are sum-
marized below:
• Email with internal URLs: The content of these emails
were from email received with an external source, but the
URLs were changed to point to our IDS severs. The goal
of these emails were to see how many users bothered to
look at the address of the recipient before opening the
email.
• Email with external URLs: The content of these emails
was modified from emails received with an external
source. The emails were designed to lure those interested
in obtaining the Apple iPad. The URLs were changed to
point to our external servers in the .info domain.
• Forms to obtain credentials: The content of these emails
contained links to forms asking users for credentials
to see how many users were willing to expose their
credentials. Credentials were not stored.
• Beacon Documents: These emails contained PDF attach-
ments that emitted a beacon to our servers when opened.
The beacons were designed so that every user emitted a
unique response enabling us to track them. An evaluation
of the beacons is provided in [10].
A. Result Summary
Table I and Table II provide an overview of all of the results
obtained from two rounds of experiments. Over the course of
several weeks, offenders were repeatedly targeted until they
stopped falling victim. The results between the two rounds of
experiments were fairly consistent. The most important point
that can be gleaned from the data:
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TABLE I
THE NUMBER OF RESPONSES FOR EACH ROUND FOR THE FIRST EXPERIMENT TO MEASURE THE USER RESPONSE TO PHONY PHISH.
Decoy Type 1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 4th Round
Email with internal URLs 52 2 0 NA
Email with external URLs 177 15 1 0
Forms to obtain credentials2 39/20 4/1 0 NA
Beacon Documents 45 0 NA NA
TABLE II
THE NUMBER OF RESPONSES FOR EACH ROUND FOR THE SECOND EXPERIMENT TO MEASURE THE USER RESPONSE TO PHONY PHISH.
Decoy Type 1st Round 2nd Round 3rd Round 4th Round
Email with internal URLs 69 7 1 0
Email with external URLs 176 10 3 0
Forms to obtain credentials 69/50 10/9 0 NA
Beacon Documents 71 2 0 NA
In all cases, users can be trained to be cautious of
suspicious looking emails, but sometimes it takes several
iterations of testing. In our experiments, the slowest
learners took at most four iterations as shown in Table
I and Table II.
Another observation from Table I and Table II is that it
appears users are less likely to respond to emails that appear
to be from internal sources, but actually have external sender
addresses. These emails were indeed suspicious, but we do
not have a good way to account for the differences in the
content. For example, the emails with external URLs (row 2)
pertain to the Apple iPad. At the time the emails were sent
out, the emails would have been enticing to the masses (i.e.,
the iPad was being released). On the other hand, the emails
with internal URLs (row 1) resembled those distributed by the
university, and are less enticing to the masses. Hence, there
is insufficient data to make any conclusion concerning these
differences.
Another point regarding Table I and Table II is that the
number of users that actually entered their credentials to the
bogus forms seemed alarmingly high (row 3). The values in
each of the columns indicate the number of users that clicked
on the links followed by the number that actually entered
credentials. We did not record the credentials and we did
not validate them to ensure they were valid. However, we
believe it is likely that at least some of the users entered valid
credentials.
Table III presents a role-wise breakdown of the results. It
can be seen that students are more susceptible to the phishing
emails than university staff. This may be attributed to the fact
that student population flux is high and the tendency to adhere
to Columbia University policies may not be uniform. Staff
awareness of, and adherence to security policies is greater
than that of the students, who may simply have no regard
for them. A similar observation can be made in case of decoy
documents. There exists a Columbia University policy that
prohibits columbia from downloading documents originating
from unknown email addresses. The results suggest that the
policy may be regarded more highly by the staff population
than the student population. Table IV provides the school-wise
breakdown of the results. It is evident from the table that there
is almost a uniform distribution of vulnerable users across the
schools affiliated with the university.
Table V provides staff-wise breakdown of the results ob-
tained. One observation that can be made from these results
are that non-academic staff are more vulnerable to phishing
attacks than the academic staff.
B. Challenges
One of the challenges in conducting these studies lies in
managing the user discontent that is generated as a result of
selecting users to participate unwittingly. Despite the messages
that were generated to describe the nature of the experiments
and the benefit they may bring, some users still had issue.
The largest challenge for us was in accommodating the users
that were not so easily fooled by the fake phishing emails, or
who correctly identified them as being suspicious. Unlike the
users that did fall for the phony phishing emails and who were
presented with messages describing the experiments, these
users were not made aware of the study. Consequently, some of
them notified the university, which required us to make contact
with them and alleviate their concerns on an individual basis.
In future studies, we may notify study participants by email
after the study is complete to mitigate this challenge.
Another challenged we faced was the confusion that arose
due to the generated emails and their similarity to real emails.
Since the generated emails were mined from Columbia servers,
there was a high likelihood that the content and themes might
be among those currently circulating. To overcome the issue
we applied natural language processing techniques to modify
themes.
V. UTILITY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
The Department of Homeland Security has the lead re-
sponsibility for securing the nations information technology
infrastructure for public, private, and international entities.
This goal cannot be achieved solely through technological
improvements, but must also take into consideration the people
and processes that rely on the technology. The proposed
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TABLE III
ROLE WISE SPLIT UP PERCENTAGE.
Role 1st Experiment 2nd Experiment 3rd Experiment 4th Experiment
Students 11.6 48.8 14.4 36.5
Staffs 19.6 21.6 12.8 4
TABLE IV
SCHOOL WISE SPLIT UP PERCENTAGE.
School 1st Experiment 2nd Experiment 3rd Experiment 4th Experiment
Fu Foundation 24.1 30.5 21.7 9.4
GSB 13.7 2.8 16.4 7.9
Columbia College 6.8 NA 8.2 34.5
School of social work 6.8 11.1 3.2 1.6
Grad-Arts and sciences 10.4 11.1 21.7 18.8
School of law 6.8 21.6 3.2 NA
Continuing Education 6.8 2.8 8.2 7.9
General Studies 3.4 11.1 3.2 4.7
School of public health 10.4 5.6 6.6 9.4
School of Nursing 3.4 NA NA NA
College of dental medicine 3.4 5.6 NA NA
SIPA NA 11.1 12.8 NA
College of Physicians NA NA NA 1.6
TABLE V
STAFF ROLE WISE SPLIT UP PERCENTAGE.
Staff Role 1st Experiment 2nd Experiment 3rd Experiment 4th Experiment
Professor/Asst Prof 16.3 18.8 48.2 42.9
Postdoc 12.2 27.8 11.1 NA
Manager NA 15.6 3.7 NA
Staffs 71.4 40.6 37 57.1
system focuses on measuring and improving the security pos-
ture of organizations through their people. A fully developed
production system that extends upon the one proposed within
this work could be used to support the DHS mission of
securing government departments and agencies. The proposed
system could provide DHS with a means of assessing the
security posture of individual departments and agencies as
well as for comparing security postures of individual agencies
against one another.
VI. OPEN PROBLEMS: BELIEVABILITY OF BOGUS
PHISHING EMAILS
The success of the system relies on its ability to synthesize
emails that are semantically equivalent to real phishing emails.
Depending on the goals, resources, and sophistication of at-
tackers, phishing emails may vary in their level of believability
to a user and ability to bypass traditional security means. The
least sophisticated phishing attacks are those aimed at tricking
the largest sets of recipients and are sent out across the net
broadly. They often contain a common invariant or signature
that allows them to be detected by email spam filters, which are
commonly deployed at an organizations email gateway. They
might also be obvious by direct observation of the individuals
receiving, making them easily avoidable. As the specificity
of targeting increases to specific companies, organizations
within a company, or at the extreme, an individual (i.e.,
spear phishing), the believability of these emails increases,
making them more likely to bypass detection by an individual.
Our initial approach has focused on constructing generative
models for phishing emails using natural language processing
and statistical techniques. So far, we have had success in
modeling the least sophisticated attacks. Our future efforts
will focus on generative models for the automated creation
of more targeted spear phishing attacks. Developing a means
to automatically create fake spear phishing emails remains an
open problem. Successfully solving it requires addressing the
fundamental properties for creating decoy-based systems that
include variability, believability, enticingness, detectability,
differentiability, and non-interference [10].
VII. CONCLUSION
The previous sections provided an overview of our system
designed to create phony phishing emails. We presented the
results of two rounds of experiments conducted at Columbia
University in which approximately 4000 staff members and
students were targeted for training using the bogus phishing
emails. The results presented in the previous section sug-
gest that users can be trained using decoy technology to
be cognizant of potential threats. Applying the same set of
measurements laterally across multiple organizations can be a
useful in measuring one organization’s security posture relative
to another’s.
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